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Lampe Social welfare in the Greco-Roman world
Seventy-five years ago, in 1939, the Dutch scholar Hendrik Bolkestein 
from Utrecht published his almost 500-page volume Wohltatigkeit und 
Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum/Charity and Poor Welfare in Pre- 
Christian Antiquity: A Contribution to the Problem “Ethics and Society”.1 
His classic monograph opened up a new line of research, as nothing 
comparable had been undertaken before, and today quite a number of his 
insights still hold. This essay is but a modest homage to this Dutch scholar, 
who was not only learned but also courageous. In the years of German 
occupation immediately following the publication of his book, he bravely 
chaired a group of professors trying to keep the teaching and research at 
Utrecht University free of Nazi ideology.2 His book is a monument, and this 
essay pays homage to him.
The present article has three parts, the first dedicated to motivations 
for altruistic behaviour that ancient theorists expounded, the second to 
actual practices of altruistic behaviour on the private level and the third to 
social welfare practices by the state.
1. MOTIVATIONS FOR ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOUR
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considers it essential for a free male 
polis citizen, for an eXeoQeptog, to freely donate from one’s assets, with such 
generosity being called {Nic. Eth. 1119b, 22ff). The contents of
both words, sXeuQeptop (free) and eXsuSEptoT^ (generosity), were inseparably 
connected. The primary objects of such generosity were equals such as 
friends who were capable of returning the favours. But there seems to be 
room even for the poor as recipients of the free men’s generosity, because 
Aristotle later in his book elaborates:
A (true)3 benefactor feels friendship and agape (cfnXowi xal iycw&o-i) 
for the recipient of his bounty even though he is not getting anything 
out of him and is never likely to do so {Nic. Eth. 1167b; similarly 
Rhetor. 1385a 17).
“It is noble to render a service not with an eye to receiving one in return” 
{Nic. Eth. 1162b). The pre-Socratic Democritus, emphasising selfless pity, 
raised a similarly unselfish voice;4 so did the Stoics following the Aristotelian
1 Reprint from the 1939 Utrecht edition in 1967.
2 Cf. preface by H. Wagenvoort in Bolkestein (1967:v).
3 Added by P.L.
4 Fragm. 96 (doing good without expecting a requital/ap.oi(3)j); 282; 278 (contrary 
to the selfless care for the offspring in the animal world, many humans hope for 
some gain/emzupeoK from their children in return); 255 (oixTi'pw/pity as motivation
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tradition. The Stoics, probably Cleanthes himself, held that a truly beneficial 
act is not intended to harvest any return but gratitude (Jibenter accipit 
beneficium reddidisse).5 But such rare voices should not fool the modern 
reader. Although Aristotle aimed at non-reciprocal altruism, the actual 
dominant culture was different. It was one of Bolkestein’s methodological 
merits to have tried to clearly distinguish actual practice from daydreaming 
by intellectuals such as Aristotle. Those selfless noble voices simply 
presupposed a widespread do-ut-des mentality, of which they disapproved.
As for the Stoics’ “noble” attitude, it does not appear that impressive 
after all. Epictetus of all people, a former slave, considered it a vital goal to 
be free from caring feelings and pity. These emotions should be superficial, 
not touching one’s inner self. Epictetus, Enchiridion 16, reads like this:
Beware that you be not carried away by the impression (4>avracr(a) 
that the (suffering) person (in front of you) is in the midst of external 
ills (ev xaxoTg ... toi; exto;) ... Do not hesitate to sympathize with him 
(crup.7repi<|>dpEo-0ai; to go about with him) so far as words go, and, if 
occasion offers, even to groan (ouvE7ricrTEvd^ai) with him, but be 
careful not to groan also in the center of your being (updo-s^s pevrai 
p.7) Xal ECTW0EV OTEVa^s).
for doing good to others; see also 107a and n. 29 below). For eXeo$, see CIL I2 
1212 (below), Demosthenes, Or. 53.7 (empathetic o-uvd^Sopai) and 53.8 (eXeew; both 
times toward a friend in need) as well as Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:141-143,172).
5 In Seneca, de benef. 2.31.1. In 2.31.3, Seneca took over this opinion (beneficium 
cuius proprium est nihil de reditu cogitare), arguing that otherwise doing good 
would not be a beneficium but a creditum, a loan that has to be paid back 
(4.11 -12), or a negotiatio, a business transaction (2.31.2). Plutarch admonishes 
to give without expecting to receive anything in return (praecepta gerendae 
reipublicae 822ab:
The masses (ol 7roX\o() are more hostile to a rich man who does not 
give them a share of his private possessions than to a poor man 
who steals from the public funds, for they think the former’s conduct 
is due to arrogance and contempt of them, but the latter’s to 
necessity. First, then, let the gifts be made without anything in return 
(yryvEcrQwcrav o3v al psTaddcrEig 7rpwTov p.sv avrl p^dsvd?); because in this 
way they surprise and overcome the recipients more completely.
The motivation for such “noble” attitude appears to be selfish power play; 
seemingly selfless giving reinforces the superiority of the donor over against 
the recipient. Also the motivation of fear - if you do not give them anything, 
they become “hostile” (cT E/oucriv) - implies selfishness. Nevertheless, by 
Plutarch’s time the “masses” have expressly become a target of giving.
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Internal freedom consisted of becoming free from all passions and 
emotions (a7ra9eia),6 that is, also from caring feelings and from pity. True 
empathy was not part of the Stoic program.
In summary, only a few moralists such as Aristotle opposed a 
widespread culture of reciprocity, which did not promote selflessness. 
This, however, reduced the chances for the poor to receive benefactions 
from private persons. Beneficial acting towards others in the Greco-Roman 
world was for the largest part embedded in a give-and-take-system - the 
exact system that Luke 14:12-24 tried to unhinge by propagating altruism 
without returns. Matthew 5:46 sneered at the return-oriented motivation of 
altruistic behaviour. But these were later Christian voices, echoing the rare 
voices of moralists such as Democritus, Aristotle and Cleanthes probably 
without knowing it. Until at least the third century CE (see below), the hope 
of receiving something in return remained the most prominent incentive to 
bestow beneficial favours on others. The Greek vocabulary illustrates this 
mentality: avTsuspyETEiv (to do good in return) counterbalanced svspyETsrv (to 
do good),7 (to be of service to) was balanced by avraxjreXeiv (to be of
service in return), or 9epa7rsuEiv (to attend to) was countered by avTifispaTrsvsiv 
(to attend to in return). One “would be ashamed to take a favour... without 
making a return,” Xenophon writes.8 The term ^api; denoted both a favour 
and the response to it by repaying it with another beneficial act and with 
thankfulness.9 Stobaeus10 in the early fifth century CE, compiling extracts 
from hundreds of Greek philosophers for his son, reported a threefold,
6 Epict., Enchir. 16 (and 11 -12); Diss. 2.1.21 +24; 4.1.82-84.
7 Xen, Mem. 2.9.8: euEpyETovp.Evov viw ^p^crav dvGpwTrav xal dvTEUEpyETOVVTa Toug p.sv 
ToiouToug cfnXovg 7toiei<t6(zi.
8 Xen., Mem. 2.8.4: o)4>eXovvto avToxfieXEicrSai; 2.10.3: aicr/uvoiTo 5’ av, el w^eXovpisvog 
wo crou pj dvTaxpEXofy ere. Xen., Cyropaedia 8.3.49:
[N]othing seemed to him (Pheraulas) so pleasant or so useful as to 
serve (9spa7reueiv) other people. For he held humans to be the best 
and most grateful of all creatures, since he saw that when people 
are praised (E7raivoup£voug) by any one they are very glad to praise 
these in turn (dvTE7raivovvTag); and when any one does them a favor 
(/api^opvoig), they try to do one in return (dvT%ap(^o-0ai); when they 
recognise that any one is kindly disposed toward them (EvvoTxwg 
eyovTcct;) they return these people’s goodwill (dvr’ su voouvTag); ... and 
he noticed especially that they strive more earnestly than any other 
creature to return the loving care of parents (dvTi9epa7reu£iv) both 
during their parents’ lifetime and after their death.
Further examples of the do-ut-des mentality in Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:156-170).
9 For references, see, for example, Liddell-Scott (1958: s.v. ^dpig).
10 Xdpiv 5e XeyscSat Tp%wg, ttjv jiev woupytav d)<jreXi'p.ou auTou exei'vou svsxa, wy 5’ apcEixpiv 
woupyfag d^eAi'piou, ttjv 5e p.v>)p)v UTOvpyi'ag T0iavT?]g. Aid touto 5e xal Tag Saijzovag TpEig
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originally peripatetic, usage of ^dptg. First, is a beneficial service 
rendered (d7roupyi'a), then it is the return (afzecxptg) of such beneficial service 
and finally the grateful commemoration of such service. Similarly,
the Pseudo-Platonic Definitions define ^dpi? as both a “voluntary good 
deed” and “the return of a rendered service in due measure.”11 Or, to give a 
last example, the Pseudo-Platonic Definitions characterised a “gift” as an 
exchange for a beneficial favour.12 Menander in the Monosticha mocked 
the do-ut-des spiral: “Whenever you receive, give back, man, and you will 
receive again!” (317);13 “love beyond measure the one who loves (you)” 
(322). But even tax collectors can do that, Matthew 5:46 reprimanded.
The objects of such reciprocal altruistic behaviour were people of 
equal or similar status or members of the own social clan, parents, 
children, relatives, especially brothers and friends. The Platonic Definitions 
consequently characterisd friendship as a reciprocal “partnership (xoivoma) 
of doing and experiencing good.”14
A subcategory of the quid-pro-quo system was “trading” beneficial 
acting for an honourable reputation. In societies in which honour/shame 
played a momentous role, this immaterial return for beneficial acts was 
highly valued. Especially when the object of doing good was the political 
community of co-citizens in which one lived, this immaterial reward played 
an important role. Athens repaid benefactors with distinctions such as 
citizenships15 or by a commemorative stele. Demosthenes writes: “Their 
deeds survive ... Those inscriptions ... may stand as proofs to all who 
wish to do us service, declaring how many benefactors our city has 
6 pioc xaTE<f»j(zi<T£. AsyscrSai de AApiv zal T4V & °Tel *1 EV Xoyoig, xa6’ tov [lev su^apiv 
dvopx^EO'Sai, tov S’ smxaptv (Stobaeus, Anthol. 2.7.23.1-7).
11 euspyscn'a exovctio?- a7r65o<ng dya9ou woupyia; ev xaipy (Ps.-Plato, Def. 413e).
12 Ps.-Plato, Def. 414a: Awpsa a/Aayp ^dpirog.
13 Aristotle expressed the same principle in a less nonchalant way:
It is exchange that binds together... This is why we set up a shrine of 
the Graces in a public place, to remind people to return a kindness. 
For that is a special characteristic of grace, since it is a duty not only 
to repay a service, but another time to take the initiative in doing a 
service oneself (Nic. Eth. 1133a).
In a sobering way Isocrates writes (Or. 15.217):
I maintain that everyone does everything that he does for the sake of 
pleasure or gain or honour; for I observe that no desire springs up in 
people save for these objects.
14 Ps.-Plato, Def. 413a 10: xoivwvla jiet’ stivola?- xoivwvla tou eu TOirjcrai xal 7t<x9eIv.
15 For example, Dem., Or. 59, In Neaeram 89.
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benefited in return” (dvr’ eu 7rs7roi'?]x£v).16 Interestingly, the term for beneficial 
services and awards/distinctions could be the same: Jwpsiaf.17 Frederick 
W. Danker’s (1982) discussions of benefactor inscriptions give wonderful 
glimpses into this public reward culture.
However, the Greeks and Romans were also aware of a third motivation 
to act beneficially, albeit not especially toward the poor. Psychologically, 
there is the mere joy of having property, which can be felt when being 
able to do something for others. There is a selfish aspect involved in 
being generous: you can feel good about yourself when doing it - not 
only because you may feel admired by others, which again would be the 
reputation motivation, but also because you please your social conscience 
or simply enjoy the power that comes with property. Being able to buy 
things for yourself, to compensate great losses (Isocr., Or. 1.28) or to cure 
one’s physical problems (Euripides, Electra 428f) as well as to give to others 
makes you feel this power and the joy that comes with it. Aristotle writes:
To bestow favours and assistance on friends or visitors or comrades 
(Aristotle does not mention the poor!) is a great pleasure (tjcHo-tov), 
which can only happen if there is private property.18
Modern science has corroborated the Greek proverb in Acts 20:35 that 
it is more rewarding to give than to receive:19 “Spending Money on Others 
Promotes Happiness,” is the title of a 2008 study in the journal Science.20 
Apparently sensing that such pleasure adds a selfish aspect to the altruistic
16 evioi tmv dvSpcov ouxet’ eicrfv. dMa to Epyct to 7rpa^0EVT’ arriv ... sxEtvai tou Trjg ttoaewc
7)0oug ptvj^siov d)cn, xal 7rapac)eryp.a0’ ecrrwcn roTg (3ouXop.svoig ri toisTv uptag dya0ov, ocroug 
e£> 7rot?jcravTOg 7) 7roXig dvr’ ev TreTrofyxsv (Dem., Or. 20, Adv. Leptinem 64).
17 Or also owpa. For example, Dem., Or. 19, De falsa legatione 330; Or. 20, Adv. 
Leptinem 35; Or. 59, In Neaeram 89; Aristot., Rhet. 1361a 37-39; 1361b 1-2.
18 Aristot., Polit. 1263b. Isocrates talks of the pleasure of “possessing so large an 
estate that I am able to assist even others” (olxcov ev to5 ndvra xal totout^v oixn'av 
xexT7)p.Evog wore xal ETEpoug eu 7roistv 5i5vacr0ai, Or. 17.56). In Or. 15.217, he confirms 
that pleasure (vfiovy) represents one of the three major motivations of human 
behaviour (see above). Seneca emphasises the gaudium of benefacere (Sen., 
de benef. 1.6.1). The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, 1446b, adds “fear” as a fourth 
one, focusing most probably on the fear of shame and criticism by other citizens 
if one is not generously giving. Ct. also Xen., Oec. 2.5-6 (failing to be beneficial 
for the common good will not be tolerated patiently but will leave one without 
support: outs 0soug outs dv0pd)7roug olptai as av dvaaxso-0ai ... sp^piov (Tup.udywv eTvai) as 
well as Plutarch, n. 5 above. Fear is the flipside of the honour motivation.
19 Maxapiov earn/ yd/Aov Jiddvai Xap.|3dvEiv, turning upside down the motto Xap.(3avsiv 
p.dX<ov V) SiJovai in Thucydides, Hist. 2.97.4.
20 Dunn et al. (2008:1687-1688).
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act,21 Epicharmos (in Plutarch, Publicola 15.5.7) held that taking pleasure 
(xai'peiv) when giving and true philanthropy are not the same pair of shoes 
(ou cpiXdvQpwjroc; tv y’ ecro-’- ... 5i5oug).
2. ALTRUISTIC PRACTICES ON THE PRIVATE
LEVEL: CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE
The poor living under the subsistence minimum did not play a special role 
in all of this.22 It was the Christian author Luke, not pagan Greek authors, 
who had particularly the poor in mind when propagating his alms-giving 
ethics. Greek ethical theory did not stylise alms giving as a special virtue,23 
nor was there anything comparable in the Greco-Roman culture to the 
Israelite concept of poor people being special to God and better followers 
of their religion.24 On the private, personal level, therefore, care for the poor 
was not a significant issue, but rather reduced, for example, to occasional 
giving to beggars,25 poor travellers or stranded sailors,26 or to alms giving 
to people in need in one’s community.
2.1 Giving to people in need in the community
It was not uncommon for Greek citizens to give clothes to those in need, 
according to a fragment by the comedy writer Philemon.27 Furthermore, 
21 In Plutarch, n. 5 above, it surfaces in a blunt and more negative way: Pleasure 
comes from the power and superiority over others, which is gained when giving 
without getting anything in return.
22 I use “poor” and “in need” in the sense of living under the subsistence minimum. 
The Greek Tiroyop comes the closest, not 7TEv^g, which - as impia, evSeta or 
5eo|zevo( - denote those who do not have enough capital to sustain themselves 
and therefore have to work (for example, Xen., Mem. 4.2.37), thus the majority 
of the society. By contrast, ttAowioi were those who had enough means so that 
they did not have to work. See Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:182-184) for references.
23 This was one of Bolkestein’s main insights (for example, [1939] 1967:199f.).
24 For example Prov. 3:34; 14:31; 15:25; 17:5; 19:17; 22:22; 23:10-11; 2 Sam. 
12:1-5; Is. 10:1-2; 11:4; 58:7; 23:6,11; Jer. 20:13; 22:16; 29:19; Ps 9:10; 10:10, 
14, 18; 68:6; 72:4; 146:9; Ex. 22:21-25; Deut. 24:12-22.
25 For references, see Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:202-214), touching also on begging 
priests and philosophers.
26 Heraclides Lembus, Excerpta politiarum 46 (provisions and money for ship­
wrecked sailors). See the careful discussion in Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:179, 
217, 224-231).
27 Fragm. 176 (ed. Kock): sdv op&v 7tevr)Tct yvp.vbv evJucd^?, yaAAov aneSvcrai; avrov, av 
iveiSlar^. See also Eurip., Fragm. 21: a p) yap &rn to 7rev^Ti ttAouctioc SlScw’- a 5’ ol 
7rXouTouvTEg ot> XEX'njp.eSa, toToiv 7rev7)cn ^pwp.evoi Tip.cdp.s8a.
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in times of grain shortage and high prices, affluent citizens could help 
less well-to-do co-citizens (cwropoi twv 7toXitwv),28 that is, not specifically 
the “poor” in our sense of the word (n. 22, above). Or when older people 
had been stripped of their means during tyranny, several people, “out of 
pity for their straits, freely bestowed something from their own,” Lysias 
recounts.29 Seneca later admonished to give alms to poor people (“a hunch 
of bread or a farthing dole tossed to a beggar”), but he did not consider 
this a beneficium, because it was too trivial and often not given to “worthy” 
recipients (de ben. 4.29.2-3).30
At least at the grass roots, in funerary inscriptions, a person could 
be praised for “honouring the powerful and not disrespecting the 
poor” (second century CE or even later):31 colui poten(t)es nec dispexsi 
pau(peres), with the latter formulation counterpointing Proverbs 17:5 (qui 
despicit pauperem). In Rome at the end of the Roman Republic, an epitaph 
- in my opinion a Jewish inscription - claimed that a deceased merchant 
was “merciful and loving of the poor,” thereby connecting alms giving 
with empathy (misericordia mercy and pity) and affective liking (amor) 
of the poor instead of selfish motivations, which was something new in 
the west.32
28 Theophr., Char. 23.5 : ev T7) orrofe'a. 5e w? 7rXs!w 7tevte toXccvto auTw yEvoiTO to avaXcopiaTO 
StSovTi tok aTOpotg twv toXitwv.
29 Lysias, In Philonem 19: olg ETSpoi Sidovai nap’ eaurav ti 7rpoflpouvTO 5ta d]V ampictv 
oixTi'pavTeg auTou;; cf. also 11: indulgence for the poor and physically disabled 
(toi; 5e 7tev7)(tiv t) dSvvczTOig tw o-wpicm); Pro Mantitheo 14: “I said that the well-to-do 
ought to provide what was necessary for those in needy circumstances” (rot; 
aTOpwg diaxsipievoig).
30 Cf., however, Seneca, Ep. ad Lucil. 95.51: “Magna scilicet laus est, si homo 
mansuetus homini est. Praecipiemus, ut naufrago manum porrigat, erranti viam 
monstret, cum esuriente panem suum dividat? ... omne hoc, quod vides, ... 
unum est: membra sumus corporis magni.”
31 CIL VIII 7858 from Cirta/North Africa not before the 2nd/3rd cent. CE. See its 
discussion in McGuire (1946:137-138).
32 ILS 7602/CIL I21212/ILLRP 797: misericors amans pauperis. McGuire (1946:146) 
considers the deceased, a freedman, an oriental from Egypt (or Asia Minor or 
Syria), based on the cognomen Euhodus. Cf. a similar Christian inscription from 
the 4th cent. CE (SEG 6.119:7rra^oug 4>iXeovto), and the exclusively Christian lemma 
<f)iXd7rraxo; in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. Pliny, Ep. 9.30.1, uses the traditional 
ethical scheme of being beneficiary towards your own country, your relatives, 
neighbours, friends, especially the poor friends (amicis dico pauperibus), to 
introduce concern for the poor in general, whom he wants to embrace with 
caring fellowship (socialitas), thus flagging a shift in ethical mentality.
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2.2 Foundations and donations
Another possibility for private individuals to do something for the less well- 
to-do was to set up a foundation for the veneration of a deity. In honour 
of this deity, the foundation financed sacrifices of food, meat and other 
foodstuffs, which were consumed by people in cheerful feasting.33 The 
invitees could be all of the inhabitants of the community where the sanctuary 
was located, even strangers happening to be in the neighbourhood and 
slaves.34 Poor people could be among them, but the foundations were 
never targeted especially to them.35
The same was true for the temples as institutions, apart from such 
private initiatives. The Church Father Ambrosius scoffed at the 
pagan temples for not having fed the poor: “Let them count up how 
many captives the temples have ransomed, what food they have 
contributed for the poor, to what exiles they have supplied the 
means of living!”36 When looking at our sources from before the 
second century CE, Ambrosius had a point. Plato (Leges 771 d) rather 
considered sacrificial festivals at temples a great opportunity to find 
a date! Nonetheless, some temples could grant refuge to debtors (at 
least by the first century CE) or to slaves having trouble with their
33 For example, /G 7.4148: toi; toXEtoi; rag euw/lag 7rapfop]Tai.
34 See, for example, Xen., Anab. 5.3.9-13 (7ravTeg ol woXtrca xal ol Tipoo-ywpoi avSps; xal 
yuvalxEg perEtyov Tfjg Eoprfjg); Plut., Nic. 3.6-4.1. Additional examples in Bolkestein 
([1939] 1967:233-235).
35 Private people also could invite others to a single meal of sacrificial meat at 
a temple; the guests usually were friends and only very rarely poor people. 
A case involving the Cynic Diogenes (Diog. Laert., Vitae phil. 6.64) may be one 
of these exceptions. Diogenes was fed filthy (puirapog) bread usually eaten by 
the lower classes (cf. Artemidoros, Onir. 1.69: by the mvr^g):
When he was dining in a temple, and in the course of the meal loaves 
not free from dirt were put on the table, he took them up and threw 
them away, declaring that nothing unclean ought to enter a temple.
According to Xen., Mem. 2.9.4-5, Criton invited the excellent speaker 
Archedemus, who only had limited means (^evy), to join his sacrificial meals at 
sanctuaries and often donated food to him. But Archedemus was not a “poor” 
man in the sense of n. 22 (above). As Criton’s friend and rhetor he worked as 
his lawyer. Plutarch, however, later advised private individuals also to donate 
“customary contributions which the donors can feel proud of” (vsvop.io-p.Eva 
cfiXoTipjjpaTa) to the poor for free (avrl p^Sevog), i.e., alms, in the context of temple 
festivals, because then the “masses” (ol iroXXol) can admire the donors’ piety 
(praecepta gerendae reipublicae; 822ab).
36 Ep. 18.16: Numerent quos redemerint templa captivos, quae contulerint alimenta 
pauperibus, quibus exsulibus vivendi subsidia ministraverint.
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masters, although temple asylums especially for poor people were 
not granted.37
Thanks to such private donations, however, by the second century CE, 
an Asia Minor temple institution offered public banquets and distributed 
gifts to both free persons and slaves. The Carian sanctuary of the 
philanthropic Zeus in Panamara38 invited all inhabitants of the area, free 
persons as well as slaves, expressly also enslaved women, as well as 
strangers living close-by,39 to be hosted at tables twice a day throughout 
the entire year, with the temple priests distributing food, presents and 
money to their guests. The funds for this generosity came from individuals, 
who also donated the building for the public banquets.40 Their private 
contributions made it possible for a temple, as an institution, to now 
provide banquets for the populace, although this had been a function of 
the state before (see below).
On the whole, after Seneca and older moralists had emphasised non­
reciprocal giving and Plutarch had made the “masses” a special subject 
when discussing non-reciprocal generosity (see above), in the ethics of 
the second century CE, the poor became more valued, with Lucianus 
(Mortuorum Dialogi 1.4) making the point that in the afterlife rich and poor 
will be equal. In Menippus, Lucianus is “highly delighted to see that” the 
rich are even worse off in the afterlife than the poor (11-12,14,17), thereby 
drawing a remote parallel to Luke’s rich man and the poor Lazarus.
In the west of the Roman Empire, private donations providing for 
distributions of food for the people in town also had become increasingly 
popular. Ambitious Romans used their largitiones (generous gifts) to 
please the citizen populace, hoping to be elected into higher offices later.41
37 See the references in Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:246-248).
38 See SEG 4.289-344 (2nd cent. CE); especially 4.300-320; 4.301 (under Marcus 
Aurelius).
39 SEG 4.303-304.
40 Among many donors, there also existed an association of contributing members 
(rd xotvov twv epaviorcov) around a certain Hermias son of Artemidoros (for this 
inscription, see Robert 1937:513-515).
41 Contrary to Greece, where a large part of private donations (emSocrei;) were 
first given to the state before the latter distributed them to the people (see 
below), Roman benefactors directly spent money on occasional meals and 
entertainments for the populace, often in search for personal gain. Cicero, 
de officiis 2.55-56, talks about generous, lavish banquets given by private 
persons, “squandering their money on public banquets, distributions of meat 
among the people, gladiatorial shows, magnificent games, and wild-beast 
fights ... to win the favour of the populace.” Cicero, pro Murena 77:
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Many candidates wanting to be elected even attempted to buy the votes 
of less well-to-do Roman citizens. Numerous laws trying to prevent this 
practice show how popular it was. Divisores acted as brokers between the 
candidates and the sellers; at times, tables were set up in public places 
where such bribery money was paid out to less well-to-do, or even poor, 
citizens - not to everybody.42
2.3 Associations
Returning to classical Greece, friends could gather together to give a 
loan, an epavog, to one of their friends, which had to be repaid without 
interest and therefore was considered a beneficial act.43 Their gathering 
was not an established club yet. The term Epavicrrai', however, did denote 
clubs,44 viewed critically by the emperors of the Roman Empire because 
of fear of political unrest. However, in a letter to Pliny (Ep. 10.93), Trajan 
legitimised one of them as an exception because it used its funds for the 
relief of hardships that members with little means had to face (concessum 
est eranum habere ... ad sustinendam tenuiorum inopiam utuntur).45 In 
the Roman world, since Augustus, the collegia tenuiorum, associations 
of persons of lesser means, can be compared.46 Contrary to a popular 
misconception, they were not specialised on providing for funerals of their 
members. They rather celebrated religious rituals with convivial meals 
and for this purpose collected a monthly contribution from everyone. 
From these funds also hardships of individual members were relieved 
Those enjoyments of games, and gladiators, and banquets ... are 
not to be taken away from the Roman people, nor ought candidates 
to be forbidden the exercise of that kindness which is liberality 
rather than bribery.
Especially aediles, being charged with the supervision of the games, generously 
donated games, money, food and banquets to the people to win their favour 
and further their career; a lucrative governorship in one of the provinces paid 
off the earlier expenditures easily. Cicero, de officiis 2.56: Other generous 
individuals “ransom captives from brigands, or assume their friends’ debts 
or help in providing dowries for their daughters, or assist them in acquiring 
property or increasing what they have.”
42 See Kroll (1933:52-54).
43 For example, Antiphon, Tetral. 2.2.9; Dem., Or. 18, de corona 312; Or. 53, contra 
Nicost. 8-9; Theophr., Char. 17.9 (in a metaphorical sense Aristot., Pol. 1332b 40). 
For further references, see Liddell-Scott (1958: s.v. epavog A II).
44 Aristot., Eth. Nic. 1160a 19-25 (QiacrwTOv xal £pav:<rrav): they exist for religious and 
social reasons, with meals following sacrifices.
45 Pliny, Ep. 10.93.
46 Trajan indeed did make this parallel by using the term tenuiores.
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and decent burials of members financed.47 However, the members were 
not “poor” in our sense of the word, because they were able to afford an 
entrance fee to the club and make a monthly contribution.48 They belonged 
to the working populace that did not have enough means to afford not to 
work (see n. 22, above).
A special case was the association of the Pythagoreans from the late 
sixth to at least the end of the fourth century BCE, which was revived 
in the first century BCE. The members often lived far apart, but helped 
each other when one of them was in need. The benefactor did not even 
need to be personally acquainted with the recipient.49 The Pythagoreans 
foreshadowed the later agape-oriented solidarity that connected the 
Christians across cities and provinces.
In summary, individual, private acts of charity existed, but the sources 
do not abound with them, let alone with a special ethics of individual 
almsgiving. Technical terms for alms, charity or giving to the poor did not 
exist in classical Greece or classical Rome. It was not until oriental and 
particularly Jewish influence on the Greek language kicked in that the term 
eXe7](zoctuv>] was coined and finally elevated to a virtue.50
2.4 Private households and patron-client relationships
We still need to probe deeper into the societal structures to be able to 
discover a more significant factor in privately provided social welfare - 
privately in the sense of independently from state institutions. Geza 
Alfoldy51 and others have pointed out the importance of vertical alliances in 
the Greco-Roman society, which were far more important than horizontal 
social strata; the latter represent a category applicable to modern societies 
but only with difficulty to the ancient Greco-Roman world. Aristocratic or 
47 CIL XIV 2112; Marcian in Dig 47.22.4.1. Also an Egyptian religious association 
of the 2nd cent. BCE obliged its members to help another member in need and 
to subsidise funerals of a poor member (P. Cairo 31179). Cf. further Downs 
(2008:107-109); Bendlin (2011:207-295).
48 CIL XIV 2112 in Lanuvium quantifies the entrance fee to the cultures Dianae et 
Antinoi at 100 sesterces and an amphora of quality wine; recently freed persons 
only paid the amphora. The monthly fee was 5 asses.
49 For example, Diod. Sic., Bibl. Hist. 10.3.4-10.4.6; Jambl., de vita Pyth. 
33.237-239.
50 Correspondingly, the term epavog did not denote alms (instead of a loan) until 
imperial times, at first in Philo, de virt. 86.3 (cf. Philo, Hypoth. 194.30: epav^w 
now denotes “begging”) and Plutarch, Comp. Arist. et Cat. 3.5.7.
51 For his pyramid model of the society of the Roman Empire, see Alfoldy 
(1984:125).
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other socially advanced families led vertically oriented social blocks of 
various sizes, some huge as the emperor’s or senatorial households, some 
much smaller such as the household of a free, but modest, craftsman who 
might have just possessed two enslaved workers. Within these households 
of various sizes, a plethora of people lived who were economically and 
legally dependent on the master at the top of each household: free family 
members, freed persons with various tasks and different levels of affluence, 
slaves and clients, who all were expected to be loyal to their masters.52 
Their households took care of all of these dependents. Menander writes: 
“How much better it is to have a good master than to live as a free person 
in distasteful humiliation.”53 However, numerous masters provided their 
care not so much for philanthropic as for economic reasons, making sure 
the workforce within the wheelworks of the household stayed healthy.
As far as the clientes were concerned, the patrons’ special relationships 
to them represented an important social-welfare factor with regard to the 
unemployed. Surprisingly, Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:201) paid almost no 
attention to the patron-client institution, categorising the famous case of 
the Athenian Kimon, for example, as simple charity acts of a generous 
man, although it represented an early case of patron-client relationship. 
The simplest report of this case is given by Aristotle,54 although tainted 
by Aristotle’s ideal of shared usufruct of private property (usus fructus).55 
Aristotle recounts that Kimon let many inhabitants of his village come to 
his house every day and receive a modest meal, which was an early form of 
the client situation, and everybody could pluck fruit on his lands if needed, 
thus participating in the usus fructus.
A cliens56 usually was a freeborn person who voluntarily57 entered a 
relationship of dependency with a more influential patron without, however, 
52 The vertical units of different sizes constituting society prevented the development 
of horizontal class-consciousness below the ranks of the nobility, precluding the 
lower population from developing homogeneous interests. Neither the slaves, 
nor the freed persons nor the clients formed a “class.” For a definition of “class,” 
see Alfoldy (1984:126-127).
53 Fragm. 1093 (ed. Kock): ci); xpe'rrrov sera Jeottotou xp^errou ru/Etv totteivco? xal 
xaxwg eXev6epov. A free person did not automatically have a higher social position 
than a slave. Often a domestic slave was better off than a free poor person. Any 
concept of horizontal social borderlines between these legally defined groups 
would be misleading.
54 A6>]va[wv IIoXiTEia 27.3.
55 For this ideal, see especially Polit. 1263a.
56 For the following paragraphs on clientes, cf. Lampe (2003:488-523).
57 The voluntary submission of a client looking for protection was called applicatio 
ad patronum (Cicero, De or. 1.177). It implied that the clients could choose on 
13
Lampe Social welfare in the Greco-Roman world
losing his or her personal freedom or legal capacity.58 The two made an 
agreement based on mutual trust and loyalty (tides). This meant that the 
client was expected to show respect and gratitude to the patron, to render 
certain services to him (operae and obsequium),59 and to support his 
political, economic and social goals. In return, the more influential patron 
protected the client’s economic, social and legal interests by letting the 
client profit from his social connections and by allowing him access to his 
resources.60 “To put the matter briefly,” the patron was expected to secure 
their own to whose power (potestas), protection and loyalty (tides') they wanted 
to submit themselves. The entirely private contract between client and patron 
was based on mutual consent. Inheritable but always-revocable land utilisation 
(precarium) could be part of the contract without being a prerequisite. 
Cf. Dionys. Halic., Ant. rom. 2.9.2 (one could choose a patron one wanted); 
2.10.4; Terence, Eun. 885; 1039; Gellius 5.13.2 (clientes ... sese ... in fidem 
patrociniumque nostrum dediderunt)-, 20.1.40 (clientem in fidem susceptum). 
There also existed involuntary patron-client relationships. Often settlers in 
conquered populations were given the land they had previously owned. The 
involuntary submission of defeated or conquered persons was not part of a 
private contract but a matter of public law; the submission under the power 
of a conqueror and the latter’s vow to loyalty (tides, which was under the 
protection of the gods to whom the patron vowed) were rooted in international 
law that regulated the relations between citizens and non-citizens. Contrary to 
the voluntary clientage, this submission could imply serious limitations to the 
legal capacity of the clients. By way of example, they had to accept the nomen 
gentile of the patron, could not marry whomever they wanted, and the patron 
often inherited their estates after their death. Such limitations did not confront 
voluntary clients. See Von Premerstein (1901:28-30, 33, 38f., 41 ff., 51).
58 For the personal freedom of the clients, see, for example, Proculus, Dig. 49.15.7 
§ 1: clientes nostros intellegimus liberos esse, etiamsi neque auctoritate neque 
dignitate neque viribus nobis pares sunt.
59 Obsequium denotes obedience and subordination. The literal translation of 
cliens is “the obedient” (participle of cluere). Plutarch, Romulus 13.7, and others 
translated cliens into TreXcro);, which denotes a person who seeks protection 
and becomes dependent. For typical duties of both clients and patrons, see 
especially Dionys. Halic., Ant. rom. 2.9-10. For financial contributions to the 
patron, see Dionys. Halic., Ant. rom. 2.10.2; 13.5.1; Livy 5.32.8; cf. 38.60.9. These 
payments helped to cover extraordinary expenses of the patron. Apart from 
this, financial gifts to the patron were frowned upon, although they could occur 
(Dionys. Halic., Ant. rom. 2.10.4; Plutarch, Rom. 13; Gellius 20.1.40; Livy 34.4.9. 
The lex Cincia de donis, probably from 204 BCE, had ruled that only very small 
presents to the patron were allowed; see Lintott (1997:32). For even military 
service for the patron until the 2nd century BCE, see Von Premerstein (1901:37).
60 The loyalty extended as far as allowing the patron to testify in favour of a client 
even against a blood-related person (Gellius 5.13.4; cf. 20.1.40). Neither patron 
nor client could sue the other in court or testify against the other (Dionysius
14
Acta Theologica Suppiementum 23 2016
for the clients “both in private and in public affairs all that tranquillity of 
which they particularly stood in need,” Dionysius wrote in a somewhat 
idealising way.61
Patron-client relationships had existed for a long time in a number of 
places in the ancient Mediterranean world.62 Early Rome, however, was 
unique in that it tried to clearly define the rights and duties of clients and 
protected their status in relation to the patron. Already the Law of the 
Twelve Tables (8.21) in the fifth century BCE made an effort in this direction: 
“If a patron shall defraud his client, he must be solemnly forfeited.” In early 
Roman times, the patron-client contract frequently involved the lending 
of a small parcel of land, a precarium, to people of no means. In this way, 
Italian patricians established personal dependency relationships. They 
lent the land for an indefinite period, but maintained the right to revoke the 
agreement at any time. Only with increasing urbanisation did agricultural 
land become less important in patron-client relations.
By virtue of the system of vertical economic dependency relationships 
between patrons and clients on the one hand, and patrons and freed persons, 
let alone slaves, on the other, large portions of the society were tied to a few 
influential families during the Roman Republic: not only the masses of slaves 
and freed persons, but also numerous freeborn persons, sometimes even 
entire communities in Italy. Powerful and wealthy Roman families secured 
their societal and political influence through droves63 of clients in Italy and 
the provinces. In fact, during the Roman Republic, political power to a large 
extent was based on the number of supporting clients.
In imperial times, the political influence of the noble families faded. 
Consequently, clientage became less a political factor but remained a 
social and economic institution. In addition, as both parties to the voluntary 
patron-client contract could be Roman citizens and the client retained legal 
Halic., Ant. rom. 2.10.3). Providing free legal advice and representation as a 
patron was called patrocinium. Cf., for example, Cicero, De or. 1.177; 3.33; 
Livy 34.4.9; Tacitus, Ann. 11.5; Dial. 3; Horace, Ep. 2.1.104; Dionys. Halic., 
Ant. rom. 2.10.1; Gellius 5.13.6. The legal representation of clients by patrons, 
however, became less and less important the more complicated law and trials 
became. Already in the late Republic, professional upper class lawyers often 
were consulted, and during a trial a temporary patron-client relationship was 
established between the professional attorney and the litigant (cf. Cicero, Att.
15.14.3). The patrons’ loss of legal competence contributed to the loosening of 
the ties between clients and patrons already in Republican times.
61 Dionys. Halic., Ant. rom. 2.10.1.
62 Cf. Dionysius Halic., Ant. rom. 2.9.2.
63 Cf., for example, Livy 5.32.8; Dionys. Halic., Ant. rom. 9.41.5; Plautus, Men. 574ff.
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freedom and responsibility, the aspect of patronal potestas (power) over 
inferior clients faded over time, whereas the moral aspect of reciprocal 
loyalty (fides) increased.64
Unlike the freed persons who were tied to their patrons by clearly 
defined legal relations, the clients’ bond to their patrons was a loose moral, 
social and economic dependency. Juridical implications were negligible.65 
Although the relationship usually was hereditary,66 it was not cut out for 
eternity but could be dissolved. Often one client spread his allegiance to 
several patrons simultaneously.67
Conversely, patrons frequently strived to have numerous clients as 
a symbol of their capacity to provide for social inferiors. Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus put it this way:
It was a matter of great praise to men of illustrious families to have as 
many clients as possible and not only to preserve the succession of 
hereditary patronages but also to acquire others by their own merit.68
64 Fittingly, since Republican times a patron and a client could marry one another. Cf., 
for example, Gellius 13.20.8; Plutarch, Cat. Maj. 24; Pliny, Nat. 7.61. The reciprocity 
between patron and client was idealised by Dionys. Halic., Ant. rom. 2.10.4:
It is incredible how great the contest of goodwill was between the 
patrons and clients, as each side strove not to be outdone by the 
other in kindness, the clients feeling that they should render all 
possible services to their patrons and the patrons wishing by all 
means not to create any trouble to their clients.
Although talking about earliest Roman times here, Dionysius insists that the 
patron-client relations described in 2.10 “long continued among the Romans.” 
Satirical authors such as Martial (see n. 71, below) counterbalanced this 
idealised picture.
65 Neither the ius civile proper nor the public law regulated the clientage. The only 
meagre legal protection of the private patron-client relationships was provided 
by the criminal law, which punished the fraus patroni, the patron’s violation of 
loyalty (cf. Servius, Aen. 6.609; Von Premerstein 1901:39-40,46). Legally not 
enforceable, the obligations of these relationships were merely governed by 
custom and reverence for the gods who protected mutual loyalty (fides). Cf. 
Dionys. Halic., Ant. rom. 2.9.3: ©spu? (custom and not legal statutes) as well as 
ocriov (divine law) established the basis.
66 Cf. Dionys. Halic., Ant. rom. 2.10.4; 4.23.6; 11.36; Plutarch, Mar. 5.
67 Cf., for example, Von Premerstein (1901:38, 52-53). Even freed persons could 
choose a patron in addition to their former slave master to whom they also 
owed loyalty (cf., for example, Cicero, Sex. Rose. 19; Att. 1.12.2).
68 Ant. rom. 2.10.4.
16
Acta Theologica Suppiementum 23 2016
In the first century CE, under the Julio-Claudian emperors, the influential 
families still were eager to increase their prestige through their clientele.69 
The clients were a glamorous retinue for a rich patron.70
The patrons in return saved the clients from unemployment and starvation. 
In the mornings, the clients presented themselves in the atrium of the patron’s 
house and made their obeisance. In Rome, they were required to dress up 
in a toga for this occasion. During the day, they surrounded the patron as
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In the first century CE, under the Julio-Claudian emperors, the influential 
families still were eager to increase their prestige through their clientele.69 
The clients were a glamorous retinue for a rich patron.70
The patrons in return saved the clients from unemployment and starvation. 
In the mornings, the clients presented themselves in the atrium of the patron’s 
house and made their obeisance. In Rome, they were required to dress up 
in a toga for this occasion. During the day, they surrounded the patron as 
his entourage, accompanied him to the Forum, to the bath, or to his visits, 
joined him for his travels, clapped for his public speeches, whether boring or 
not, and walked behind his sedan chair.71 They addressed him as dominus 
(“sir”) or even rex (“king”) and sometimes honoured him with a statue.72 In 
Pompeii, some actively supported their patrons’ election campaigns for city 
offices.73 These were time-consuming services. And most often clients 
were not enthusiastic about their “job”. In foul weather, they cursed the 
early morning walks across the city to the patron’s house. They frowned 
when they were ranked lower than other clients at the patron’s receptions. 
They deplored cases of lacking tides (loyalty). Martial, Juvenal, Lucian 
and Epictetus continually reported these complaints.74 However, for their 
services, the clients were paid a sportula each day that they arrived at the 
patron’s house. Originally, the sportula had been “a little basket,” as the 
word translates literally, containing food. In imperial times, the sportula 
mostly was pocket money. At the time of Martial, at the end of the first 
century CE, it usually amounted to 25 asses, for which one could buy, for 
instance, twelve and a half loaves of bread or six liters of good wine.75 That 
got a client through the day!
In addition to the sportula, the patrons occasionally invited the clients 
to dinner. This was especially done at the festival of the Saturnalia. Now 
and then the clients were given a piece of clothing or some extra money.
69 Tacitus, Ann. 3.55.2; Hist. 1.4.
70 Even less wealthy patrons aimed for a large entourage, with some getting into 
debt to be able to finance this status symbol (Martial, Ep. 2.74).
71 For Roman clients and their often unpleasant life, see, for example, Martial, 
Ep. 12.68.1 -2; 9.100.2; 6.88; 4.40.1; 3.38.11; 3.36; 2.74; 2.18; 1.108; 1.59; 1.55.5-6; 
Seneca, de benef. 6.33.4-6.34.5; Livy 38.51.6; Juvenal 1.95ff.; Suetonius, 
Vesp. 2.2.
72 See, for example, Horace, Ep. 1.7.37. For a statue: CIL V11390; cf. Pliny, Nat. 34.17.
73 CIL IV 593; 822; 933; 1011; 1016.
74 See n. 71, above, and Friedlander (1979:227f.).
75 For prices, see Lampe (1989:163). For 25 asses, cf. Martial, Ep. 1.59. Martial 
(Ep. 9.100.2) also knows of a sportula of 3 denarii (= 48-54 asses).
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Sometimes they were offered a loan or a surety. Very rarely did they receive 
a whole farm as a gift or were granted free lodging.76
In summary, the urban private households notably contributed to social 
welfare. They provided support for clients, offering a low-paid “job” to 
those among them who otherwise faced unemployment. In addition, they 
provided sustenance, a place to stay and, if necessary, training in a trade 
for domestic slaves. Furthermore, they usually remained loyal to their freed 
slaves who could expect some protection and occasional support from their 
former masters. Thus, private households precluded thousands of people 
from sliding into the category of “poor.” That this social-welfare contribution 
of the private households involved the labour of legally enslaved people 
represents the paradoxical backside of the system.
3. SOCIAL WELFARE PRACTICES BY THE STATE
Having focused on the behavioural motivations, morals and practices of 
private individuals, their households and voluntary associations, the social 
welfare measures of the political communities still need to be looked at, 
albeit only from a bird’s eye view again.
The theorist Aristotle (Polit. 1320ab) recommended that the city collect 
sufficient assets from the affluent citizens to be able to distribute enough 
money to the citizens with no or little means so that they can buy some 
kind of small business to support themselves. Aristotle also claims that 
the affluent citizens of Tarentum allowed their less well-to-do, but working, 
co-citizens (xotva ttoioCvts? to xt))[zczto toi; anopoiQ em X.P’1criv euvouv, 1320b), 
thus not specifically the “poor,” to be co-users of their private properties.77 
This transfer of the friendship ideal to the state level sounds similar to 
the social-utopist Travra-xoiva ideal of the Greek-Hellenistic tradition that 
Luke alludes to in Acts 2:44 and 4:32 (“to have everything in common”). 
For Aristotle, the motivation for such social measures, however, was not 
the wellbeing of the majority of the populace, but securing the position of 
the richer ones by keeping the masses (to 7vAyj0og) happy and democracy 
stable (1320ab).
While this was political theory, on the de-facto level the Greek polis states 
acted as catalysing distributors of private donations by wealthy citizens.
76 Cf. Dig. 7.8.2 §1, 3; 9.3.5 §1; Tacitus, Ann. 16.22 (Thrasea takes time for the 
private businesses of his clients); further Friedlander (1979:227).
77 Cf. again also Polit. 1263a where Aristotle recommends that ownership of 
property should be private but all citizens allowed to use some of this property. 
The state legislature ought to provide for such a system, he advises.
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The well-to-do - most often voluntarily and generously - gave out of their 
means (emJocrEi?) so that the state could deal out this public income to the 
people, for example, by buying and distributing grain. Besides revenues 
such as income from land that the state owned or tributes from dependent 
states, the assets of rich citizens filled the polis state’s coffer. Thus, the 
measures of the state that had social-political effects were an indirect 
way of how well-to-do private individuals in the Greek world acted in a 
beneficiary manner.78 The Greek polis state’s financial burdens rested on 
the shoulders of a minority of wealthy citizens, while all citizens enjoyed 
the usus fructus of the state’s assets - not in the ideal way that Aristotle 
had in mind but in the following realistic ways.
3.1 Grain distributions
The Greek city-states made sure there was enough food, especially grain, 
on the market by regulating the merchants’ imports of grain and also buying 
it on its own. Demosthenes, for example, was made an officer buying 
grain,79 apparently ad hoc when the Macedonian army was approaching 
Athens. Soon this function became a regular state office in the poleis, the 
criTwvai (“public buyers of grain”) being elected by the people. Alternatively, 
the city-states could give funds to private businessmen commissioning 
them with the purchase.
The city-state regulated the food prices on the market, making sure 
that food remained affordable. Moreover, the polis distributed grain, 
usually for free. The recipients of the monthly distributions, however, were 
not the poor, but all free male citizens. Regardless of their families’ sizes 
and their wealth, they all were given the same amount, provided they were 
in town and reported to the officials. Of course, some citizens might have 
been poor. But other people without citizenship living in poverty were left 
to fend for themselves.
In Rome, the citizens had experienced occasional distributions of 
cheap grain already before Gaius Gracchus. But it was at his initiative 
that rules almost identical to the Greek ones were established, making 
the distributions a regular institution. One of the differences was that the 
78 Another way of being a beneficiary as a well-to-do citizen was to serve in one 
of the polis state’s offices where there was plenty of opportunity to spend one’s 
own assets for the public good. In Rome the aediles, for instance, generously 
spent money for the people, hoping to be elected to higher positions. For 
the following state measures, see the still valuable discussions of literary 
and epigraphic evidence by Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:252-286, 349-379). Most 
recently, cf. for example, Bresson (2016).
79 Cf., for example, Bresson (2016:333f.) with references and further examples.
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citizens for the monthly grain portion had to pay a modest price below 
the market value; only later, in 58 BCE, one of the Leges Clodiae made 
the distributions free of charge. Another difference was that the funds 
for such distributions were not supplied by donating wealthy citizens but 
by conquered provinces paying tributes. In this way, the Roman state 
distributed generous donations of its own wealthy citizens to a much 
lesser degree than the Greek city-states did. Furthermore, when Caesar 
reduced the number of grain recipients to allegedly 150,000,80 this capping 
probably did not intend to give preference to the poor among the citizens, 
but to discourage impoverished citizens without land from drifting from 
the countryside into the capital city. Nevertheless, at least the poor with 
citizenship who already resided in Rome profited from this capping, as 
much as they appreciated the aediles controlling the food prices.
3.2 Money and meal distributions
Returning to the Greek world, at the regular public festivals the polis states 
distributed money or free seats, again only to the citizens. At the sacrificial 
meals of these festivals, provided by the city-state,81 the free male citizens, 
and often the resident aliens ((zetoixoi) as well, were hosted for free, with 
also meat being served. The poor outside these social groups, however, 
remained on the sidelines. How little these state benefactions were 
especially tailored to the poor could be seen when respected persons 
sometimes received greater meal portions than the co-citizens.82
Augustus, however, with his more or less regular money distributions to 
the people, ranging up to 100 denars per person, also made children (pueros) 
recipients.83 Nerva and his successors later would develop this practice 
into alimenta programs for needy children.84 After Augustus, distributions 
of money and gifts became customary for newly installed emperors. The 
80 For example, Suet., Caes. 41.3; Cassius Dio 43.21.4.
81 By contrast, the Roman sacra publica only seldom entailed feedings of the 
people. See Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:378).
82 Nonetheless, a Greek village community usually provided a Xeop) f°r travellers, 
including beggars, to sleep at night: a roofed room open to everybody, where at 
daytime the village gossip was exchanged. Cf. already Hom., Od. 18.329; Hes., 
Op. 493; 501; also Ps-Herodot., Vit. Hom. 12.
83 Suet., Aug 41; Cassius Dio 51.21.3.
84 See the study by Fitzgerald in this volume (pp. 29-48). In the private sector, 
individuals set up such foundations for children as well. Pliny (Ep. 1.8.10,12), 
for example, established a foundation for freeborn children in his hometown 
of Comum probably already at the end of the first cent. CE. See also ILS 977 
and the alimentary foundation OIL X 6328; furthermore Hands (1968:108,114, 
184, 197); Garnsey (1989:67).
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emperors stylised themselves as protectors of the poor, now associating 
the traditional food and money distributions with their own persons.85 The 
new focus on the poor in social politics can be seen when Antoninus Pius’ 
wife Faustina, for example, donated an allowance of 3000 modii of grain 
expressly to the “poor” (7vra;<ot$) of a city.86
Another social measure in the Greek, but not Roman, world was wages 
paid to citizens for attending the meetings of the Srj^o<; or serving jury duty. 
The latter affected quite a number of Athenian citizens, as each of their 
numerous trials required 200 to 500 jurors. Small craftsmen or workers 
with citizenship could profit from this. The Greek poor without citizenship, 
however, were again not reached by this measure.
3.3 Land distributions
Athens at times sent economically weaker free citizens, members of the 
two lowest of four census classes, to foreign parts controlled by classical 
Athens, such as the Thracian Brea, and allotted land to them to own and 
farm.87 Needless to say that Rome following its later huge expansions 
applied this measure on a much larger scale, giving vast parts of the 
conquered territories to Roman citizens for free to own and cultivate.88 
There is no indication, however, that only low class or poor citizens were 
chosen for such ownerships. On the contrary, the state did not provide for 
any loans that less well-to-do citizens would have needed to establish a 
new farm.89 It was not until Nerva and Trajan that such loans were given;
85 See, for example, Pliny, Paneg. 25.3-26.7. Numismatic evidence in Bolkestein 
([1939] 1967:469).
86 S. Abercii Vita 65 (ed. Nissen, p. 46.17-18): cm^pecriov roi; mSXewg aurou
rpicr^iXfoug pioJfoug ch'tou.
87 For example, Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:248-251).
88 The settlers obtained an ager coionicus with the expectation to also defend 
it, or an ager viritanus, usually in already pacified regions without the need 
for defence. These two differed from the ager occuparius, which was received 
from the populus Romanus without becoming private property; the state could 
reclaim it any time. Cf., for example, Pennitz (1998:124f.).
89 Tiberius Gracchus tried to correct this but was opposed by the senate. Plut., 
Tib. Gracchus 14:
Tiberius courted popular favour by bringing in a bill which provided 
that the money of King Attalus, when brought to Rome, should be 
given to the citizens who received a parcel of the public land, to aid 
them in stocking and tilling their farms.
Tiberius Gr. also pushed for a committee that was supposed to enforce among 
other things the legal provision that nobody should get more than about 125 ha
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Nerva also granted land to numerous poor individuals.90 But earlier, during 
the Roman expansions, a major part of the agricultural land went to large 
landowners with capital, while the numbers of free little farmers dwindled. 
Tiberius Gracchus in the second century BCE somewhat foreshadowed 
the Jesus logion of Matt 8:20, describing the proletarians’ lives:
The wild beasts that roam over Italy have every one of them a cave 
or lair to lurk in (to ptev Oxjptct to ttjv ’IraXiav vep.6p.eva xai cbwXeov e/et xai 
xoitoTov ecrnv avrwv exacrrw xat xaTaSucreig), but the (military and veteran) 
men who fight and die for Italy (only) enjoy the common air and light 
... houseless and homeless they wander about with their wives and 
children ... they fight and die to support others in wealth and luxury, 
and though they are styled masters of the world, they have not a 
single clod of earth that is their own.91
It was only after the army reform by Gaius Marius at the end of the same 
century that veterans received special consideration when conquered land 
was distributed; many of them had never owned land before.
3.4 Education
Unlike Rome, Greek city-states often took the education of their youth into 
the own hands, from the fourth century BCE onward establishing militarily- 
oriented ephebeias to prepare young men for citizenship.92 In Hellenistic 
times, several Asia Minor cities provided for public elementary school 
education for freeborn children, at times possibly even for daughters.93
of the ager publicus (Livy 6.35.4-5). After his death, the committee stopped 
working effectively. A later agrarian legislation plan by the tribune Rullus failed 
to obtain a majority, with Cicero torpedoing it. In 59 BCE under Caesar, however, 
this attempt was renewed: Money that had come in from Pompeius’ conquests 
was used to buy private land for distribution, and a second lex agraria ruled 
that the ager Campanus was also opened up for coloni (veterans or fathers of 
three children; Suet., Jul. 20; Cass. Dio 38.7.3). Citizens without land thus got 
the chance to build up a farming existence that sustained them lastingly. For 
discussions of the Roman agrarian policy, see, for example, Bolkestein ([1939] 
1967:349-364; 467); Schubert (1980); Walter (2013).
90 See, for example, ILS 6509; 6675; Yavetz (1987:147f.); Grainger (2004:57-60).
91 Plutarch, Tib. Gracchus 9.4-5.
92 Cf., for example, Kennell (2006); Reinmuth (1971); Wiemer (2011).
93 See, for example, the evidence discussed in Ziebarth (1914:32, 37-42). However, 
whether OG/S 309.9-12 (cf. also CIG 3185.20) proves that “the supervisor of 
education” (7rct.iSovdp.o<j) not only schooled boys but also unmarried girls (7rap0svoi) 
at Teos in western Asia Minor may be questionable: In a cultic context on a 
religious holiday in the 160s BCE, not only the free-born boys had to sing an 
altar hymn but “also the girls selected by the supervisor of education” were 
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3.5 Medical care and care for invalids
Unlike Rome, which did not hire public doctors until late imperial times,94 
Greek city-states employed medical doctors elected by the people (&)pio$). 
Slaves, poor and rich free persons could consult them for free.95
Unlike Rome, Athens also supported its invalids, de facto mostly military 
veterans, if their possessions remained below a relatively low exemption 
amount. In other words, finally a social measure especially tailored to 
poor (invalid) citizens can be observed. The invalids’ inability to work was 
compensated by public assets, usually furnished by rich citizens. The 
poor, however, who were able to work but made their living as beggars 
were sanctioned by polis legislations.96
3.6 Orphans, widows and the elderly
Unlike the Roman state, which left care of these groups entirely to the 
private sector, Greek city-states ruled that an orphan together with his 
or her assets had to be put under the tutelage of several guardians with 
citizenship. They had to take care of the child’s subsistence, education and 
legal matters and were intended to control one another. In addition, the 
city-state put an official (ap^wv/leader) above the orphans to check on their 
treatment. At times even an additional control committee was established. 
All of this was set up to protect the interests especially of wealthy orphans, 
whose assets were attractive to greedy relatives. But the ap^cov also listened 
to accusations about an orphan being otherwise mistreated, either by third 
parties or guardians. Moreover, the state supervised that female orphans 
without assets and brothers got a dowry from the next closest family 
supposed to “perform a dance and sing a hymn.” That the education supervisor 
picked these girls may show that he instructed their dancing and singing and 
possibly taught some religious content, but not necessarily that he schooled 
boys and girls together in other matters. The girls were “selected” from among 
the other girls in town, implying that only those especially suited for cultic 
processions and choir music were picked.
94 Cod. Theod. 13.3.8/Cod. Just. 10.53.9 regulated the salaries of the physicians 
in 370 CE.
95 For example, Herod., Hist. 3.131; Aristoph., Acharn. 1030-1032 (5>]fiocneuw: to 
practise as public physician like Pittalos); 1222; Vesp. 1432; Plato, Politicus 
259a; Gorg. 455b; Xen., Cyropaed. 1.6.15; Diodor. Sic., Bib. hist. 12.13.4 (Sy^oHm 
[zicr0a> Toug vocrouvrag t&jv iSicorwv wo iarpwv 0£pa7reuecr0at); furthermore Bolkestein 
([1939] 1967:274f.).
96 Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:273f.). For laws against begging, cf. Bolkestein ([1939] 
1967:282-286). For the following paragraph on orphans, the elderly and widows, 
cf. the evidence in Bolkestein ([1939] 1967:275-282).
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member; its amount was proportionate to the assets of this relative. The 
polis state finally took care of both the children and parents of fallen troops.
But otherwise elderly people, also widows, were not of particular 
concern for the Greek city-state. It expected the families, especially the 
children, to take care of their elderly. When candidates for public office 
were interviewed, they were questioned, among other things, about their 
care for the parents.97
Thus, we are referred back to the private households as the main provider 
of social welfare. The early Christians, when using the oikos as the centre of all 
church activities, hardly had any choice but to take over these traditional social 
tasks of the pagan private household and make them church functions.98
The bird’s eye view of the present essay remains highly selective and, 
with limited space, depth of field is lacking for fine-tuned differentiation 
among the six centuries at stake, or between the western and eastern 
shades of the Greco-Roman world. The purpose was more modest, that 
is, phenomenological, to show what was possible at all in Greek and 
Roman social-welfare morals and practices before Christianity, thus trying 
to pave the way for investigating Christian social-welfare ethics in their 
continuity and contrast to the Greco-Roman environment. The ancient 
material shows the enormous role of civil society - private persons, their 
households and associations - in holding up social-welfare functions. By 
contrast, the state was comparatively less involved, the commonwealth of 
the Romans, especially in Republican times, even less than the Greek city- 
states. The Greek poleis often invested income such as wealthy citizens’ 
donations in social welfare, thus brokering between wealthy private donors 
97 For example, Xen., Mem. 2.2.13:
The state ... inflicts penalties on the man who is ill-mannered to his 
parents and rejects him as unworthy of office, holding that it would 
be a sin for him to offer sacrifices on behalf of the state and that he 
is unlikely to do anything else honourably ... If one fails to honour his 
parents’ graves, the state inquires into that too when examining the 
candidates for office.
Cf. also Aristot., Athen. pol. 55.3 (e7tsito yoveac el eu 7roiei); Aeschin., Timar. 28: 
Under the heading “Scrutiny of public men” (the lawgiver) says, “If 
any one attempts to speak before the people who beats his father or 
mother, or fails to support them or provide a home for them,” such 
a man he forbids to speak (in the public assemblies) ... if a man is 
mean toward those whom he ought to honour ... how will such a 
man treat the members of another household and the whole city?
Cf. also Demosth., In Aristog. I 65-67. Ibid. 24 and Hyperides, Fragm. 160.5: In 
addition to office holders, no one should treat their parents badly (xdxzocn; yovewv).
98 For this, see further Lampe (1993:18-38).
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and less well-to-do persons. The church, living in private household 
structures during the first centuries, took over the social-welfare tasks of 
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